Shikha Mukerjee | As Democracy Returns In Bangladesh… What Next?

A landslide victory of 212 seats out of a total of 300 elected seats in the Bangladesh parliamentary elections notwithstanding, the leader of the centre-right Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Tarique Rahman, the incoming Prime Minister, was oddly noncommittal on how he would ensure that democracy, freedom and rights, including human rights, were firmly re-established in the country. The BNP’s victory, as Mr Rahman said, is Bangladesh’s victory. What exactly that meant he did not explain, probably because he is walking on eggshells in a fragile polity that has just reasserted its identity as a non-sectarian democracy. The new government headed by Mr Rahman, who will take over from interim head Muhammad Yunus and is due to be sworn in on Tuesday, February 17, will probably lean towards building a narrative of inclusion and consensus with the principal political forces active in Bangladesh, including the new National Citizens’ Party, which has links with the Jamaat-e-Islami. Mr Rahman, in his first press conference, spoke of the need for reconciliation and unity so that the “evil force”, meaning Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League, could not restore autocracy in the country and make Bangladesh a “subservient state”. How that inclusion and consensus will be ensured with the Jamaat as the principal Opposition, which its leader Shafiqur Rahman said was building itself up to become the ruling party in the future, is not clear. Asif Nazrul, a law professor at Dhaka University, hit the nail on the head in an Al-Jazeera interview: “It is reasonable to expect they will play a responsible and constructive role in parliamentary politics.” What Mr Rahman did commit to was implementing the 31-point charter that was the BNP’s manifesto and the dissent the party articulated against the 31-point charter of Mr Yunus’ interim administration that took over after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster by a Gen Z-led mass uprising comprising youth elements like the Students Against Discrimination, Bangladesh Chhatra League, Jubo League, support from the Jamaat and fringe political outfits with strong ideological Islamic fundamentalist roots. In what order the 31-point charter would be implemented, Mr Rahman left vague. As much as he bypassed the issue of the 84-odd point referendum that saw an almost 60 per cent “yes” vote, so did the media, enabling him to make broad and general statements about democratic reconstruction, restoring institutions, steering the economy back to the growth path away from its capture by “oligarchs”, ending corruption and restoring normalcy in law and order. Nobody is quite clear what the 84-point referendum, which has no constitutional validity under Bangladesh’s Constitution, actually covers. It is reformist certainly, advocating “increasing women’s political representation, imposing prime ministerial term limits, enhancing presidential powers, expanding fundamental rights, and protecting judicial independence and a bicameral national legislature with a 100-member upper house.” It is for Tarique Rahman to figure out how enhancing presidential powers and a 100-member upper house fits into his vision of a democratic, unified Bangladesh. The “yes” vote for reforms is a message to the new PM that he hasn’t been given untrammelled power, despite his huge victory. The spectacular result is not entirely a win for the BNP and his leadership; it’s a vote for democracy and the BNP represents not only itself, but also voters who usually back the Awami League, but couldn’t do so this time as it was banned from taking part in the election. How Mr Rahman and the BNP repay their debt to the Awami League will be a politically sensitive issue for the new government. The election does imply that Sheikh Hasina’s return to Bangladesh politics is a near impossibility. There is uncertainty over how the Awami League can resurrect itself minus the Mujibur Rahman dynasty, since many of its top leaders have fled and Tarique Rahman is unlikely to want to negotiate for their return, busy as he will be in striking bargains with his Opposition and partners over the next steps to implementing his manifesto and accommodating the agenda laid out in the referendum charter. Asserting that Bangladesh’s foreign policy will be based on national interest and qualifying it by emphasising that under his leadership it will not be a “subservient state”, Mr Rahman has laid down the broad contours of the diplomatic strategy he intends to pursue, vis-à-vis India, Pakistan, China and the United States. With the Jamaat as the principal Opposition, Mr Rahman’s rhetoric and actions will have to communicate to his domestic audience that his government is not a “client” of New Delhi, a charge that was levelled against Sheikh Hasina and continues to be an emotive issue in Bangladesh. The containment of the Islamic fundamentalist forces, of who the Jamaat is a moderate version, is Bangladesh’s unequivocal articulation of its identity as a religiously moderate, culturally conscious and inclusive nation. It contradicts the propaganda spread by India’s ruling BJP and its affiliates that the country’s eastern flank was in danger of becoming Islamist, hostile and a threat to national security and to a further decline in the Hindu population along the borders. The narrative of a Muslim invasion from Bangladesh will have to be either moderated or customised to fit the new reality of a BNP-ruled neighbour. While it is true that the Jamaat won an unprecedented number of seats in the districts bordering India, the BJP’s fear-mongering about a wave of infiltration into West Bengal, Assam and Meghalaya is unlikely to get any traction among voters in the 2026 Assembly polls. On the contrary, the containment of aggressively communal and sectarian Islamist elements by the non-sectarian centrist BNP may push voters in West Bengal to re-think about the choices they have on offer for the 2026 Assembly elections, with the Trinamul Congress on the one hand and the BJP on the other. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s immediate welcome to the new political order that has taken over in Bangladesh is a clue to how the Indian government views the change; it wants to be friends. If Mr Modi wants to improve the relationship, which is currently at an all-time low with Bangladesh, he has big problems on his hands; there is the shelter to Sheikh Hasina issue, which cannot go on forever, and there is the BJP’s favourite narrative of the Rohingya and Muslim “invasion” from Bangladesh. The new Bangladesh government will certainly demand changes on both issues and Mr Modi has to make up his mind on how to do it if he wants to protect Indian investment and trade across the border. Shikha Mukerjee is a senior journalist



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